What is the difference between an extensive revolution and an intensive revolution?

What is the difference between an extensive revolution and an intensive revolution?


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I have tried Google, my textbook, and I just can't seem to find the difference between these two types of revolutions.


Those are now unused terms, they were partially used during the American Independence but here's what they mean:

An extensive revolution is one in which events happen in a similar way in small areas as part of a larger area. What that means is that is you split that land into smaller sections you will have a directly proportional number of people revolting. Example: If you have let's say 1 million people revolting on a 1 million Km^2, in a smaller area of 100 000 Km^2 you will have about 100 000 people revolting. So this involves maintaining proportionality. Revolutions in some East Europe countries in the 90s are an example, when people went out in the street into many/most large cities of each country.

An intensive revolution means that the events happening are not dependent on the size of the territory or the amount of participants. A coup d'etat would fit such definition since in this case a small group of powerful individuals can overthrow an existing government and it does not matter how big the country is or how many others in various areas support this. This does not involve any proportionality.


Industrial Revolution - From Industry 1.0 to Industry 4.0

Technical advances also change the way humans produce things. The step into production technology, which was completely different from the past, is also called the industrial revolution. The new production technologies fundamentally changed the working conditions and lifestyles of people. What were the industrial revolutions and where do we find ourselves now? &ldquoFrom the First Industrial Revolution to Industry 4.0&rdquo


What is the difference between intensive and extensive agricultural systems as they relate to livestock production?

Technology has become a dominant part of our everyday lives and our food production system is no exception. Accordingly, since the turn of the 20th century, the standard approach to production has shifted from extensive production to intensive production as businesses have opted to replace natural services with technology.

In this respect, intensive livestock production systems use higher amounts of labor and physical capital [e.g. machines] relative to the land area where production takes place. The physical capital and human labor aim to replace the need for free space, grazing area, and natural sources of water.

To replace natural inputs with technological alternatives, it is necessary to rely on inputs produced thousands of kilometers/miles away – a factor that maintains agricultural dependency on fossil fuels.

Animal feeding operations [AFOs] and concentrated animal feeding operations [CAFOs] are the most notorious examples of intensive livestock production systems. Within these operations, extremely large numbers of animals are produced within confined spaces.

According to a report commissioned by The National Association of Local Boards of Health, AFOs refer to operations that exclusively produce animals that are enclosed for a minimum of 45 days a year. A CAFO is an AFO that produces a particular number of animals at or above a particular concentration and the water supply comes in contact with the flow of animal waste products.

For example, CAFOs house a minimum of 1,000 beef cattle, 700 dairy cows, 2,500 pigs weighing a minimum of 55 pounds, 82,000 egg-laying chickens, or 125,000 broiler chickens. Staying in such tight quarters requires the heavy use of antibiotics, with 80% of all antibiotics used in the United States being used in agricultural operations.

Such practices are integral to industrialized agriculture.

Housing animals in such also create large amounts of concentrated waste, CO2, and methane which is damaging to local soil and water sources. Moreover, animal wastes have generally been reintegrated into the environment as manure. However, intensive meat and dairy production are typically monoculture operations which removes the opportunity for establishing a closed-farm system.

Contrastingly, extensive farming systems depend on the carrying capacity [soil fertility, terrain, water availability, etc.] of a given piece of land and often responds to the natural climate patterns of an area.

It does not depend on a large amount of pesticides, fertilizers or other chemical inputs relative to the land area being farmed. This is how most livestock production takes place in the world. Herders are the classic example.

The main difference between the two types of agriculture is that extensive agriculture requires much more land for production and profitability than intensive production. As such, extensive agriculture is often practiced where population densities are low and land is inexpensive.

The danger of intensive agriculture, apart from environmental degradation and animal welfare issues, is that prices can be depressed by overproduction when extensive tracts of land are used for production – despite the intense nature of agricultural practices.

Low prices do not reflect the actual price of food production and can result in poor market results. It can also be argued that because of the extremely low price of food, it is a resource that is taken for granted and often wasted – especially in the Western world.

In extensive production systems, if animals graze on public lands, a Tragedy of the Commons situation can arise if users abuse the public lands in their self-interest without considering the impact on the common good.


Comparison to earlier centuries

The striking thing about postwar economic growth is how recent such growth is. I have said that total world production has been growing at over 4 percent since 1960. Compare this to annual growth rates of 2.4 percent for the first 60 years of the 20th century, of 1 percent for the entire 19th century, of one-third of 1 percent for the 18th century. 2 For these years, the growth in both population and production was far lower than in modern times. Moreover, it is fairly clear that up to 1800 or maybe 1750, no society had experienced sustained growth in per capita income. (Eighteenth century population growth also averaged one-third of 1 percent, the same as production growth.) That is, up to about two centuries ago, per capita incomes in all societies were stagnated at around $400 to $800 per year. But how do we know this? After all, the Penn World Tables don&rsquot cover the Roman Empire or the Han Dynasty. But there are many other sources of information.

In the front hall of my apartment in Chicago there is a painting of an agricultural scene, a gift from a Korean student of mine. In the painting, a farmer is plowing his field behind an ox. Fruit trees are flowering, and mountains rise in the background. The scene is peaceful, inspiring nostalgia for the old days (though I do not know when the painting was done or what time period it depicts). There is also much information for an economist in this picture. It is not difficult to estimate the income of this farmer, for we know about how much land one farmer and his ox can care for, about how much can be grown on this land, how much fruit the little orchard will yield and how much the production would be worth in 1985 U.S. dollar prices. This farmer&rsquos income is about $2,000 per year. Moreover, we know that up until recent decades, almost all of the Korean workforce (well over 90 percent) was engaged in traditional agriculture, so this figure of $2,000 ($500 per capita) for the farmer, his wife and his two children must be pretty close to the per capita income for the country as a whole. True, we do not have sophisticated national income and product accounts for Korea 100 years ago, but we don&rsquot need them to arrive at fairly good estimates of living standards that prevailed back then. Traditional agricultural societies are very like one another, all over the world, and the standard of living they yield is not hard to estimate reliably.

Other, more systematic, information is also available. For poor societies&mdashall societies before about 1800&mdashwe can reliably estimate income per capita using the idea that average living standards of most historical societies must have been very near the estimated per capita production figures of the poorest contemporary societies. Incomes in, say, ancient China cannot have been much lower than incomes in 1960 China and still sustained stable or growing populations. And if incomes in any part of the world in any time period had been much larger than the levels of the poor countries of today&mdasha factor of two, say&mdashwe would have heard about it. If such enormous percentage differences had ever existed, they would have made some kind of appearance in the available accounts of the historically curious, from Herodotus to Marco Polo to Adam Smith.

To say that traditional agricultural societies did not undergo growth in the living standards of masses of people is not to say that such societies were stagnant or uninteresting. Any schoolchild can list economically important advances in technology that occurred well before the industrial revolution, and our increasing mastery of our environment is reflected in accelerating population growth over the centuries. Between year 0 and year 1750, world population grew from around 160 million to perhaps 700 million (an increase of a factor of four in 1,750 years). In the assumed absence of growth in income per person, this means a factor of four increase in total production as well, which obviously could not have taken place without important technological changes. But in contrast to a modern society, a traditional agricultural society responds to technological change by increasing population, not living standards. Population dynamics in such a society obey a Malthusian law that maintains product per capita at $600 per year, independent of changes in productivity.

How then did these traditional societies support the vast accomplishments of the ancient civilizations of Greece and Rome, of China and India? Obviously, not everyone in these societies was living on $600 per year. The answer lies in the role and wealth of landowners, who receive about 30 percent to 40 percent of agricultural income. A nation of 10 million people with a per capita production of $600 per year has a total income of $6 billion. Thirty percent of $6 billion is $1.8 billion. In the hands of a small elite, this kind of money can support a fairly lavish lifestyle or build impressive temples or subsidize many artists and intellectuals. As we know from many historical examples, traditional agricultural society can support an impressive civilization. What it cannot do is generate improvement in the living standards of masses of people. The Korean farmer plowing his field in the painting in my hallway could be in any century in the last 1,000 years. Nothing in the picture would need to be changed to register the passage of the centuries.

If the living standard in traditional economies was low, it was at least fairly equally low across various societies. Even at the beginning of the age of European colonialism, the dominance of Europe was military, not economic. When the conquistadors of Spain took control of the societies of the Incas and the Aztecs, it was not a confrontation between a rich society and a poor one. In the 16th century, living standards in Europe and the Americas were about the same. Indeed, Spanish observers of the time marveled at the variety and quality of goods that were offered for sale in the markets of Mexico. Smith, Ricardo and their contemporaries argued about differences in living standards, and perhaps their discussions can be taken to refer to income differences as large as a factor of two. But nothing remotely like the income differences of our current world, differences on the order of a factor of 25, existed in 1800 or at any earlier time. Such inequality is a product of the industrial revolution.


Positive effect of green revolution

High yield crops

Along with the chemical advances used with this period, it has also led to the introduction and development of high-yield crops. These crops are specifically made to produce more amount of overall yield. Another method called as multiple cropping also got implemented at the time of the Green Revolution. It led to higher levels of productivity. This production of larger amounts of food also increased the productivity that made it easier to feed the increasing human population.

Cheaper prices of food

Besides production of food in larger amounts, the Green Revolution made it possible to cultivate more crops on the same land with a similar level of effort. This lowered cost of production resulted in lesser prices of food in the entire market. Bigger yields with the same level of work resulted in lowered cost of production that ultimately reduced consumer costs and enhanced profits.

Protects the environment

As more food can be produced from current croplands via the Green Revolution, it has resulted in lesser needs of conversion to other types of land. This enhanced ability to cultivate more amount of food on the land is also useful for the environment. This is because it meant that less natural land required to get transformed to farmland for the production of more amount of food.

With green revolution, the natural land isn’t required for agricultural land. It is safe for utilization by plants and animals for their natural habitat. This revolution also resulted in creating a consistent supply of food.

Eliminates the requirement for fallowing

Fallowing is a way that farmers use to safeguard their land in dry climates. Through Green Revolution, the requirement to fallow gets eliminated as fertilization, weed control and irrigation makes possible for the production of food. Farmers are seen to obtain more amount of income in dry land as their croplands have become more productive with this revolution.

Makes food supply predictable

Before introduction of green revolution, it was uncertain to predict food supply. In absence of favourable weather conditions, the harvest would get lowered. The lesser availability of food, resulted in its higher pricing. Due to the Green Revolution, farmers are able to predict harvests. With manageable weather conditions at each field, the influence of poor harvesting seasons has been significantly reduced.

Creation of more jobs

Green revolution has created to more job vacancies throughout the agricultural sector. With more jobs, it has resulted in more income. This in turn created a flourishing economy and gave people an opportunity to rise above poverty with passing time.


Conclusions

Developing country agriculture is faced with a growing set of challenges: meeting the demands of diet diversity resulting from rapidly rising incomes feeding rapidly growing urban populations accessing technologies that are under the purview of proprietary protection and gearing up for the projected negative consequences of climate change. Even as it absorbs the new challenges, the food policymaking community continues to grapple with its traditional preoccupation of the persistence of hunger and poverty in low income countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, and lagging regions of emerging economies.

Harnessing the best of scientific knowledge and technological breakthroughs is crucial for GR 2.0 as we attempt to reestablish agricultural innovation and production systems to meet today’s complex challenges. New global public goods are needed that focus on shifting the yield frontier, increasing resistance to stress, and improving competitiveness and sustainability.

The number of alternate suppliers of agricultural technologies, specifically seed-based technologies, has expanded rapidly over the last two decades. Strong NARSs and the private sector have become major players in the research, generation, and release of new varieties. Even nongovernmental organizations and civil society organizations are becoming active in developing community seed systems. Innovative partnerships are needed across the entire R&D value chain to channel the varied expertise to enhancing smallholder productivity growth.

At the country level, public policy can play an important role in ensuring that new innovations reach and benefit smallholders and encouraging the sustainable use of natural resources. This role requires policies that (i) emphasize agriculture as an engine of growth and poverty reduction, (ii) enhance competitiveness of modernizing agricultural systems, and (iii) focus on sustaining the resource base by correcting distortions that create incentives for unsustainable use. Both infrastructure investments and institutional reform can help create the enabling environment for smallholder productivity growth. Furthermore, a probusiness policy environment that includes intellectual property protection, reduced trade barriers, and a transparent biosafety procedure will lead to additional private sector research investments in the emerging economies.

However, the opportunities to meet these needs are not without concurrent challenges in the areas of international coordination of public good research, weak R&D and policy capacity among low income developing countries, and increasing demands for immediate results. Climate change will also stress agricultural systems in poor countries as well the capacity of the suppliers of public good R&D. Implementing a GR 2.0 will have to contend with all of these challenges and sequence innovations over time to succeed in achieving sustainable change.


Revolution and Revolt

Revolution and revolt have a shared origin, both ultimately going back to the Latin revolvere “to revolve, roll back.” When revolution first appeared in English in the 14th century, it referred to the movement of a celestial body in orbit that sense was extended to “a progressive motion of a body around an axis,” “completion of a course,” and other senses suggesting regularity of motion or a predictable return to an original position. At virtually the same time, the word developed a sharply different meaning, namely, ”a sudden radical, or complete change,” apparently from the idea of reversal of direction implicit in the Latin verb. Revolt , which initially meant “to renounce allegiance,” grew from the same idea of “rolling back,” in this case from a prior bond of loyalty.


Why settle down?

Though the exact dates and reasons for the transition are debated, evidence of a move away from hunting and gathering and toward agriculture has been documented worldwide. Farming is thought to have happened first in the Fertile Crescent of the Middle East, where multiple groups of people developed the practice independently. Thus, the “agricultural revolution” was likely a series of revolutions that occurred at different times in different places.

There are a variety of hypotheses as to why humans stopped foraging and started farming. Population pressure may have caused increased competition for food and the need to cultivate new foods people may have shifted to farming in order to involve elders and children in food production humans may have learned to depend on plants they modified in early domestication attempts and in turn, those plants may have become dependent on humans. With new technology come new and ever-evolving theories about how and why the agricultural revolution began.

Regardless of how and why humans began to move away from hunting and foraging, they continued to become more settled. This was in part due to their increasing domestication of plants. Humans are thought to have gathered plants and their seeds as early as 23,000 years ago, and to have started farming cereal grains like barley as early as 11,000 years ago. Afterward, they moved on to protein-rich foods like peas and lentils. As these early farmers became better at cultivating food, they may have produced surplus seeds and crops that required storage. This would have both spurred population growth because of more consistent food availability and required a more settled way of life with the need to store seeds and tend crops.


A Concept Too Many?

In 1983, D. C. Coleman summarily dismissed protoindustrialization as “a concept too many.” Footnote 117 Since the spread of handicraft textile production failed to predict the diffusion of its mechanized successors, Coleman concluded that the new paradigm was merely the artifice of sociologically inclined historians. After all, the concept neither pinpointed the geographical origins of modern industry nor explained why it arose in certain regions. But Coleman's reproach was too comprehensive. For instance, the historians of protoindustrialization did valuable archival and interpretive spadework about urban-rural production networks in early modern Europe. They also offered beguiling and tough-minded assessments of the veillées (evening gatherings) and by-employments that carried villagers through the dark winters of northern Europe.

For the historian of early modern European papermaking, it would be equally easy to dismiss summarily de Vries's depiction of an industrious revolution during the long eighteenth century. The evidence of longer hours and newly intensified work in the mills is either paper thin or altogether absent, and paid labor for all members of papermaking households had old roots. The virtuous circle of demand- and supply-side explanations in the coming of large-scale industrialization, as de Vries described it, failed to take shape in papermaking. Instead, it was the limited prospects for fresh industriousness in hand papermaking that led manufacturers and engineers to search for a mechanized alternative.

But just as attention to protoindustrialization opened new avenues of inquiry, de Vries's paradigm has also prompted creative research and reconsideration. Hans-Joachim Voth's ingenious use of English court records is the most compelling of these studies. Essentially, he mined the testimony of Londoners to reveal what they were doing when they witnessed crimes. On this (somewhat indirect) basis, he concluded that the city's laboring classes expanded their year's work by twenty percent during the latter half of the eighteenth century. Yet, Voth's account of the motives behind this increase remains incomplete: Did these growing hours of toil reflect new consumer aspirations or the press of desperation, or as times changed, both? Footnote 118 And since the English state ceaselessly raised taxes on a wide variety of goods, did Londoners labor more hours simply to stand still as consumers? Footnote 119 De Vries himself has mocked the emphasis on the working poor's increasing consumption of beer and tobacco during the long eighteenth century as an “Andy Capp” caricature of the era's consumer revolution. Footnote 120 (His model centered more on household purchases of goods manufactured elsewhere, such as mirrors and tortoiseshell combs.) But late afternoons of ribaldry, smoking, and drinking wine or beer surely cemented the solidarity among journeymen paperworkers and allowed tramping men to learn the location of an opening and earn the right to it. Often, these were the ties that bound—and prevented hunger or worse. Here were the moments when the tramping man found out where to pawn a pearl-handled knife or trade it for food, just as his distant ancestors likely had. We still need evidence of the precise links between whatever new patterns of consumption emerged during the long eighteenth century and measurable shifts in the pace and duration of labor, especially in large workshops and manufactories. Only then can we assess what was revolutionary or even newly “industrious” about the drives and efforts of early modern Europe's skilled industrial hands before they were overpowered by the mechanization of their arts.


Find out more

Agricultural Revolution in England: The Transformation of the Agrarian Economy 1500-1850 by Mark Overton (Cambridge University Press, 1996)

The Transformation of Rural England: Farming and the Landscape, 1700-1870 by Tom Williamson (Exeter University Press, 2002)

Farm Production in England 1700-1914 by ME Turner, JV Beckett and B Afton (Oxford University Press, 2001)

Two Hundred Years of British Farm Livestock by Stephen JG Hall and Juliet Clutton-Brock (British Museum [Natural History], 1989)

The Agrarian History of England and Wales edited by J Thirsk (Cambridge University Press: vol. IV, 1967 vol. V, 1985 vol. VI, 1989)


Watch the video: Evolution vs Revolution